Preface
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another. Foucault also saw in Kant's essay a new philosophical attitude consisting of genuine reflection on the "present"-a turning of the more traditional, eternal gaze of the philosopher onto the contemporary moment, and, with that, an associated task of theorizing knowledge in relation to current times. Foucault dubbed this "the attitude of modernity" and located its resonance in the writings of nineteenth and twentieth century authors, starting foremost with Charles Baudelaire. "By 'attitude,'" Foucault wrote, "I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task" (1997:309) . This attitude brought together philosophical inquiry with critical thought focused on contemporary historical actuality. Philosophical training and reflection would now apply themselves to the contemporary moment-most notably, the French revolution-and concentrate on reasoning through the present. Foucault saw in Kant the origin of a modern attitude that would run through Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, Durkheim, Rusche and Kirchheimer.
In another essay bearing the same title, Jürgen Habermas adds: "Surprisingly, in the last sentence of his lecture Foucault includes himself in this tradition" (1994:150).
Once again, the attitude of modernity triumphed over the critique of reason. In these pages, I argue that the two strands Foucault identified in Kant's essay-the crucial moment of critical reason and the modern attitude-collided throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, and that the modern attitude repeatedly prevailed. Even when the moderns were engaged in the most critical of enterprises, the attitude gained the upper hand and offered up new ways of conceptualizing and making sense of the present, consistently beyond the limits of reason. Never daunted by those warnings about illusions, never chastened by the foolish excesses of earlier generations, modern thinkers continued to theorize contemporary historical actuality beyond reason's bounds.
I propose, today, that we finally abandon the misguided attitude of modernity. It will mean, no doubt, leaving much to chance. This is all for the better. Let me explain.
1.
The moderns posed three questions of punishment. The first, born of the Enlightenment itself, sought to identify and define a rational basis for punishing. As men freed themselves from the shackles of religious faith, this first question took shape: If theologians can no longer ground political and legal right, then on what foundation does the sovereign's right to punish rest? On what basis does the state have a right to punish its citizens? Naturally, the question was not entirely innocent-no good questions ever are.
It was animated by a desire to locate the righteous limits of the sovereign's punitive power at a time that was marked-at least in the eyes of many of the first modern men of reason-by excessive punishments. The right to punish, it turns out, would serve to limit punishment.
"Here, then, is the foundation of the sovereign's right to punish crimes," a young, twenty-five-year-old Cesare Beccaria would declare in 1764: "the necessity of defending employ in the history of the origin of law: . . . whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and redirected by some power superior to it" (1967: 77).
It was fruitless to look for the right to punish in its purposes, utilities, or functions-whether from a utilitarian or deontological perspective. " [P] urposes and utilities are only signs that a will to power has become master of something less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a function," Nietzsche emphasized ( With the birth of the social sciences in the late nineteenth century, this critical impulse gave rise to a second line of inquiry. More skeptical, more critical, the questions probed and excavated deeper processes and forces: If the rational discourse over the right to punish is mere pretext and serves only to hide power formations, then what is it exactly that punishment practices do for us? What is the true function of punishment? What is it that we do when we punish? From Emile Durkheim to Antonio Gramsci and the later Frankfurt School, Michel Foucault, and fin-de-siècle trends in penology, twentieth century moderns struggled over social organization, economic production, political legitimacy, governance, and the construction of the self-turning punishment practices upside down, dissecting not only their repressive functions but more importantly their role in constructing the contemporary subject and modern society. We must first rid ourselves of the illusion that penality is above all (if not exclusively) a means of reducing crime. . . We must analyse rather the 'concrete systems of punishment', study them as social phenomena that cannot be accounted for by the juridical structure of society alone. . . ; we must situate them in their field of operation, in which the punishment of crime is not the sole element; we must show that punitive measures are not simply 'negative' mechanisms that make it possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude, to eliminate; but that they are linked to a whole series of positive and useful effects which it is their task to support (Foucault 1979:24; 1975:29-30 ).
All this, from the Frankfurt School. The key task that emerged from that second line of inquiry, then, was to unearth the deeper forces and relations of power that, through the means of punitive practices, shape us as contemporary subjects. To explore, in effect, "How a specific mode of subjugation could give birth to man as an object of knowledge for a discourse with scientific status" (1975:28-29). To discover and trace the deeper forces that shape our punitive practices and, through them, our knowledge of ourselves.
However, a series of further critiques-critiques of metanarratives, functionalism, and scientific objectivity-would chasten this line of inquiry and nudge it around the cultural turn, helping shape a third discourse on punishment. This line of inquiry would
focus not on what punishment is doing for us, but on what punishment tells us about ourselves: What do our punishment practices tell us about our cultural values? What is the social meaning of our institutions of punishment? Less meta-theoretical, less criticaltheoretic, this final set of questions would build on, while simultaneously trying to avoid, the searing critique of the construction of knowledge. The questions were intended to be less normative. A description at most. A compelling interpretation. Something to make sense of our world and ourselves. Something to ground, perhaps later, an evaluation of those punishment practices.
The difference was subtle, but important. The second set of questions-especially as they evolved over the course of the twentieth century-had become increasingly focused on the constructed nature of knowledge, what has come to be known as the "power/knowledge" critique: How, exactly, do we come to believe what we hold as true?
How is it, for instance, that we come to believe a progress narrative of punishment? What institutions and practices shape us to believe in the idea of the "delinquent"-or, for that matter, in the idea that we could possibly "rehabilitate" or "correct" that "delinquent"?
How have our own disciplinary practices contributed to shaping our beliefs? By the late twentieth century, this second set of questions had begun to revolve entirely around the formation of knowledge and to constitute an acid-test for all knowledge claims regarding punishment.
In contrast, the third set of questions-the product, as I mentioned, of a critique of metanarratives-tried assiduously to avoid the power/knowledge critique. It cut a more humble profile. It sought only to reflect on what our punishment practices tell us about ourselves, our values, our society-as a mere prolegomenon to a better understanding of punishment, to make possible, later, a better evaluation of our practices and institutions. David Garland's book, Punishment and Modern Society (1990), though ostensibly a pedagogic treatment of the four leading voices in the sociology of punishment, reflects well this third line of inquiry. "The social meaning of punishment is badly understood," Garland contends. What is needed is "a descriptive prolegomenon which sets out the social foundations of punishment, its characteristic modern forms, and its social significance" (1990:9). The social meaning of punishment "needs to be explored if we are to discover ways of punishing which better accord with our social ideals" (1990:1).
This line of inquiry represents, in Garland's words, "a deliberate attempt to shift the sociology of punishment away from its recent tendency-engendered by Foucault and the Marxists-to view the penal system more or less exclusively as an apparatus of power and control" (1990:1-2). The task is to develop "a pluralistic, multidimensional approach," "a rounded, completed image; a recomposition of the fragmentary views developed by more narrowly focused studies" (280) . To explore "multiple causality, multiple effects, and multiple meaning" (280) . Garland explains:
Values, conceptions, sensibilities, and social meanings-culture, in short-do not exist in the form of a natural atmosphere which envelopes social action and makes it meaningful. Rather, they are actively created and recreated by our social practices and institutions-and punishment plays its part in this generative and regenerative process. (Garland 1990:251) In this sense, the third line of inquiry calls for richly textured, thick descriptions of our punishment practices intended to expose their social meaning and their role in shaping the fabric of society. All this to serve as a preparatory to normative analysis-to provide "a proper descriptive basis for normative judgments about penal policy" (1990:10).
It is not entirely clear, however, whether such an endeavor can escape the power/knowledge critique. If Foucault's disciplinary hypotheses were themselves susceptible, surely an interpretation of the "social meaning" of punishment practices and institutions would also be vulnerable. Any interpretation would tell us more about the interpreter and her belief systems, than about the meaning of the practice itself. Surely the semiotic enterprise would reveal more about the modes of reasoning, beliefs, and ethical choices held by the individual interpreter than about the social meaning of the punishment practices themselves.
The closing paragraphs of Garland's book are revealing in this respect. Modern societies, Garland writes, should expect less from punishment and "might be encouraged to treat it instead as a form of social policy which should, where possible, be minimized" (1990:292). The goal should be to socialize and integrate young citizens, not punish them: "a work of social justice and moral education rather than penal policy. And to the extent that punishment is deemed unavoidable, it should be viewed as a morally expressive undertaking rather than a purely instrumental one" (1990:292). These, I take it, are significant normative commitments that, in all likelihood, bleed into and color a cultural critic's interpretation of the social meaning of punishment practices.
As dusk fell on the twentieth century, modern writings on punishment continued to reflect more on the authors than on the punishments. Somehow, despite the reformulation of the questions, the texts still told us more about the interpreter's beliefs, intuitions, and ethical choices, than about the practices of punishment and their social meaning.
2.
What do we do now-now that we have seen what lies around the cultural bend and realize, painfully, that the same critiques apply with equal force to any interpretation of cultural meaning that we could possibly slap on our contemporary punishment practices?
Should we continue to labor on this final set of questions, return to an earlier set, or, as all our predecessors did, craft a new line of inquiry? What question shall we-children of the 21st century-pose of our punishment practices and institutions?
The answer, paradoxically, is that it does not matter. The formulation of the questions themselves never really mattered, except perhaps to distinguish the analytic philosopher from the critical theorist, the positivist from the cultural critic-minor differences that reflected nothing more than taste, desire, personal aptitude, upbringing, and training. Yes, new questions were formulated and new discourses emerged, but the same problem always plagued those modern text.
In all the modern texts, there always came this moment when the empirical facts ran out or the deductions of principle reached their limit-or both-and yet the reasoning continued. There was always this moment, ironically, when the moderns-those paragons of reason-took a leap of faith. It is no accident that it was always there, at that precise moment, that we learned the most-that we could read from the text and decipher a vision of just punishment that was never entirely rational, never purely empirical, and never fully determined by the theoretical premises of the author. In each and every case, the modern text let slip a leap of faith-a choice about how to resolve a gap, an ambiguity, an indeterminacy in an argument of principle or fact.
The inevitable space between theoretical or empirical premises and the final judgment derives, in the end, from that imperceptible fissure in the human sciences between the not-falsified, the not-yet-falsified, the apparently unfalsifiable, the verified but only under certain questionable assumptions, and truth. In the empirical domain, no less than in philosophical discourse, legal analysis, and public policy debates, proof never followed mathematical deduction, but rested instead on assertions-whether empirical or logical-that may well have been true, but for which other entirely reasonable hypotheses could have been substituted. The key issue was always which hypothesis to believe from among the many possible hypotheses, all of which were consistent with the data; which sub-principle to uphold from among all the possible sub-principles that were theoretically coherent with the guiding principle. What the moderns chose to believe, ultimately, told us more about them than it did about the world around them. It was always the answers that moderns gave to the questions-regardless of the question itself-that revealed the most about them and their intuitions about just punishment.
Ironically, this gap is precisely what made possible the moment of enlightenment at the very heart of critical theory-what Raymond Geuss refers to as that reflective opening that "gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation" (1981:2). Once we lifted the veil from our eyes and realized fully that our rational belief in certain theories or premises were no better than religious faith-that we had taken a leap of faith to arrive at our conclusion-it then became possible to trace the genealogy of how we took that leap. In this respect, Jacques Derrida-no hero of mine, I assure you, far too ambiguous and playful for my taste-was entirely right though when he wrote that the foundation of law itself rests on a leap of faith-what he refers to as "a performative force, in other words always an interpretive force with an appeal to faith" (1994:32). Legal authority traces to this act of auto-authorization, itself never subject to a legal evaluation of right or wrong-not simply, though certainly, because the legal framework itself post-dates the founding moment, but also and more importantly, because the judgment that a punishment is just must always overcome the gap between theoretical premises and final judgment. The act of reaching the legal conclusion-the just punishment, the sentence, the execution-represents "a stroke of force, a violent performative act, and thus an interpretation that is in itself neither just nor unjust" (1994:32-33). And it is precisely in this sense that Derrida concludes, paradoxically, that the structure of the law is what opens the door to the very possibility of deconstruction itself-thus his playful hypothesis that justice makes possible deconstruction (1994:36). Though addressing law and justice, Derrida's point applies equally well to the other disciplines that form the field of crime and punishment, such as sociology, politics, economics, and public policy.
I said "ironically" earlier because it is precisely the moment of critical perception and enlightenment that simultaneously undermines the claims of the radical critical theorists-though, sadly, not necessarily those of the deconstructionists. that have a more lenient adult than juvenile criminal justice system. Levitt then compares the relative offending rates of young adults as they turn from juveniles to adults-as they reach majority and become subject to the adult criminal justice system.
Levitt finds that juveniles who have turned adult in the first category of statesthose with relatively more severe adult systems-offend less in their first year of majority than they did in the previous year, whereas those juveniles in states with relatively more lenient adult systems offend more than they did the previous year. 4 Levitt concludes from this that deterrence, rather than simply incapacitation, is at work: "Sharp drops in crime at the age of majority suggest that deterrence (and not merely incapacitation) plays an important role" (1998:1156). the primary channel, then one would expect longer delays in the transition from the juvenile equilibrium to the adult equilibrium due to lags in the timing of arrest and sentencing. . . It seems likely that large immediate changes in behavior associated with the age of majority are likely to primarily reflect deterrence" (Levitt 1998 (Levitt :1172 . The logic of the argument, then, rests on the assumption that deterrence works more speedily than incapacitation at the transitional period around majority.
The trouble with this logic, though, is that there is no metric to test the speed of either mechanism alone, nor to compare the speed of the two competing theories. There is no way, a priori, to determine how fast either effect would take-whether it is a month, two months, three months, six months, nine months, twelve months, eighteen months, Here, then, is the gap: there is no measure, no metric, no standard against which we could declare that an effect on crime-deterrence or incapacitation-is abrupt or delayed. Nor is there any way to determine how the two effects would compare. We do not have a measure for the incapacitation effect, and a separate one for the deterrence effect. We just have one number, and have to guess whether it seems relatively immediate or relatively delayed. Since we do not know how long the incapacitation effect takes, there is no way of knowing from annual crime data whether the effect looks more immediate or more delayed-whether it is incapacitation or deterrence.
Why is it that Steven Levitt is prepared to skip over this gap and confirm the deterrence hypothesis? It doesn't really matter. I would tend to emphasize taste, desire, training, and professional advancement; but there may be other explanations. What does matter is that there is a gap and a leap of faith-of faith in rationality-that we can identify. Here it is a gap of the not-yet-falsified type. A theory that is consistent with the data, but does not exclude other competing hypotheses. It would be wrong to base public policy on these empirical findings.
Racial profiling

5
A number of economists contend that the use of racial profiling improves the efficiency of policing by increasing the number of successful searches. 6 Assuming that people respond rationally to the increased cost of offending-assuming rational action theory-targeting more police resources at a higher-offending population will reduce their rate of offending (given the greater likelihood of being detected and punished). If we assume, in addition, that minorities have a higher offending rate than whites, then the optimal level of profiling occurs when the offending rate of minorities declines to the same level as the offending rate of whites. At that point, the police will maximize the number of successful police interventions and have no legitimate interest in profiling minorities to any greater extent. The economists verify these conclusions with accurate mathematical equations and economic models.
Even under these assumptions, however, racial profiling may increase the overall societal rate of offending. It all depends on the relative responsiveness of the two groups-the profiled minorities and the non-profiled whites-to policing. If minorities are less responsive to policing then whites, then their decrease in offending will be outweighed, in absolute numbers, by the more elastic responsiveness of whites-i.e. by the increased offending of whites in response to the fact that they are being policed less. This is true despite the fact that the overall number of successful police interventions increases-despite the fact that the police are detecting and punishing more crime. I demonstrate this with accurate mathematical equations and economic models in Against Prediction (2007).
The economists had essentially assumed in their model of racial profiling that minorities are as responsive to policing as whites, if not more. If they hadn't made that crucial assumption, then their own models would demonstrate that racial profiling may increase the amount of crime in society-which is most definitely not an efficient outcome. Their claims are non-falsifiable but only under dubious assumptions. This, I take it, is a gap within their own model: even assuming deterrence (which itself is, for many, a leap), there is a gap over which these economists took a leap of faith.
Why? Again, it doesn't matter. I would speculate that it is because they desire a clean, parsimonious, mathematical model that affirms rationality. Maybe that's why they became economists. But again, why they took a leap of faith does not really matter. What matters is that they took it and that we can identify it. We should not rely on it to make public policy.
Order Maintenance 7
For a third illustration, let's turn to a modern policing practice. In the early 1990s, several major U.S. cities began implementing order-maintenance strategies, most notably During the 1990s, several proponents of order-maintenance declared that the broken windows theory had been empirically verified. 8 They rested this assertion on the findings of a 1990 study titled Disorder and Decline. Subsequent research discovered several gapping flaws in the study that undermine confidence in the findings. 9 Even putting those gaps aside, the 1990 study used a static dataset to test a dynamic hypothesis:
the data consisted of disorder and robbery victimization at one point in time, whereas the broken windows theory posited a developmental sequence over time. The statistical analysis could not-and as a result, did not-falsify the broken windows hypothesis. As Ralph Taylor succinctly observes, the 1990 study was simply off the mark "because these data are cross-sectional, and the thesis is longitudinal" (Taylor 2006 (Taylor : 1626 . The gap here was between the not-yet-falsified-because-not-really-tested and truth. Again, it was inappropriate at the time to form public policy on its basis. The trouble with the Kelling and Sousa study is that they do not control for what statisticians call "mean reversion." An examination of their data reveals just that: those precincts that experienced the largest drop in crime in the 1990s were the ones that experienced the largest increases in crime during the city's crack epidemic of the mid-to late-1980s. In other words, it may well be true that the precincts that received the greatest dose of broken windows policing in the 1990s experienced the largest declines in crime.
But those precincts were precisely the ones that were hit hardest by the crack epidemic that fueled homicide rates in New York City from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s.
Everywhere that crime skyrocketed as a result of the crack epidemic, crime declined sharply once the epidemic ebbed-which, it turns out, was also true across the country. Why are Kelling and Sousa willing to take a leap of faith and advocate policies based on the broken windows theory-a theory that is at best not falsified? It doesn't matter. I think I know why, but of course I may be wrong: George Kelling, the co-author of the original Broken Windows article, has a lot invested in its truth, especially now that he's running a consulting business, the Hanover Justice Group, that markets brokenwindows policing methods to city mayors and councils. But again, it really doesn't matter. What matters here is that we've identified another gap and a corresponding leap of faith.
10 I would suggest that the second half of our study, which focuses on the MTO program, does in fact falsify the broken windows hypothesis, but will leave that to another day. In that second part, Jens and I explore the empirical results from MTO, a social experiment underway in five cities, including New York, Chicago and Los Angeles-three of the largest cities that implemented broken-windows style policing-as well as Baltimore and Boston. Under the MTO program, approximately 4,800 low-income families living in high-crime public housing communities characterized by high rates of social disorder were randomly assigned housing vouchers to move to less disadvantaged and disorderly communities. Jens and I compare the crime rates among those who moved and those who didn't-using official arrests and self-report surveys-and the results are clear, though disappointing: moving people to communities with less social or physical disorder on balance does not lead to reductions in their criminal behavior. Neighborhood order and disorder do not seem to have a noticeable effect on criminal behavior.
The Harm Principle
11
The gaps are not only empirical. They also inevitably arise in the derivation of The same offense principle, however, would not preclude private sexual conduct including prostitution.
12
Other contemporary liberal writers similarly relied on the offense principle rather than the harm principle. Herbert Packer, for instance, wrote: "It seems that prostitution, like obscenity and like other sexual offenses, should be viewed as a nuisance offense whose gravamen is not the act itself, or even the accompanying commercial transaction, but rather its status as a public indecency. That is the approach taken in England, where law enforcement does not seem to be plagued with the self-imposed problems that our prostitution controls engender" (Packer 1968:331) .
and fear-inducing than the fleeting shock of death. It was also not useful because capital punishment had a brutalizing effect on society (1995: 67). Jeremy Bentham-the very spokesman for the theory of marginal deterrence in the modern era-agreed entirely: "the more attention one gives to the punishment of death the more he will be inclined to adopt the opinion of Beccaria-that it ought to be disused. This subject is so ably discussed in his book that to treat it after him is a work that may well be dispensed with" (Hart 1982: 41). It is almost funny to watch these moderns twist and contort themselves to justify their own ethical intuitions about killing other people. The only issue for a rational choice theorist is whether the death penalty actually deters homicides, net of any other effect.
Becarria chose to believe that the brutalizing effect outweighed the deterrent effect.
Becker chose to believe that people fear death. The empirical literature is all over the lot, 13 yet Becker and Posner decide to believe those economists who find a deterrent effect. It's remarkable to watch-though disheartening for those who once believed in the critical project of reason.
This is not to suggest that the rational choice theorists alone exhibit raw choice.
Listen to Hegel: "Beccaria's endeavor to have capital punishment abolished has had beneficial effects. Even if neither Joseph II nor the French ever succeeded in entirely abolishing it, still we have begun to see which crimes deserve the death penalty and which do not. Capital punishment has in consequence become rarer, as in fact should be the case with this most extreme punishment" (247 emphasis added (note to paragraph 100)). These are telling words. What they tell us, though, is not the right way to formulate the inquiry, nor the correct answer to the proper question, but something more fundamental about the personal convictions of the author-and how it is, exactly, that authors bridge the inherent indeterminacy of their own principles.
4.
These gaps and ambiguities will bury the modern period-or at least, they should. Even the sharpest of critics, the most radical thinkers have never been able to escape the overpowering urge to build some new construct, a new edifice, some bridge to get to the other side of knowledge. Neither the followers of Nietzsche, Durkheim, or Marx, nor the cultural critics were able to resist the lure of reconstruction, always cobbling together the "best evidence" to soften their landing. Not even Michel Foucault-that wisest of moderns-could resist displacing our faith in rehabilitation with a genealogical storyone that required just as great a leap of faith. Tragically, this is as true of the cultural critics as it was of the two earlier inquiries.
Many have argued over the ages-and still do-that we should simply continue to live with our structure of knowledge and adjust our expectations of truth: that the not-yetfalsified simply is the best model-which is, obviously, hard to dispute-and that we should continue to deploy reason to select the most robust empirical inferences and the most coherent deductions of principle. But the idea that we could distinguish between different hypotheses consistent with the data or principles based on what "makes the most sense," "sounds the most reasonable," or "seems the most coherent," is simply fantastic.
Those types of judgment are so culturally determined and so highly influenced by our particular time and place, it is inconceivable that any rational being today could possibly continue to make those statements at this late stage of modernity-at least, with a straight face.
No more. It is too embarrassing to watch as one generation after another of moderns, under the banner of reason, hop, jump and skip over the gaps of knowledge.
One would have thought that phrenology would have been sufficient to stop us in our tracks, but, no, instead we got biological determinist theories of social behavior applied to male rape, moral poverty theories of delinquency applied to super-predator black males, rational action theories applied to suicide bombers-and the list goes on and on of theories that require so many caveats and exceptions that even a child would question our modern claim to rationality.
We can no longer leap over the not-yet-falsified. It is no better than turning the persuasive, what disciplines we defer to-than it does about the "social meaning" of the practice itself. And even when we do come to a rich description that makes sense of the world around us, even when we achieve that formidable task of symbolic interpretation, we are no closer to drawing normative conclusions. We are located precisely at the gap, forced to take a leap. The symbolic interpretation tells us nothing about how the practice came about, how to transform or change it, or how to modify its social meaning. Social meaning offers no purchase on action.
5.
Where does this leave us? Surprisingly, with several formidable tasks, which I would describe under the twin rubrics of social physics and randomization.
Social physics
The first task is to triage all philosophical arguments, principled discourse, and social science findings, and save only those that involve social physics. By "social physics" I mean only those claims that are necessarily true as a result of the physical nature of our mortal existence. Theories that depend on the intermediation of human consciousness and decision-making should be set aside, left to deal with later when we have more leisure time or, perhaps, when we have made breakthroughs in those new consciousness studies. For the time being, though, we should focus on social physics only.
By way of illustration, let's consider four theories dear to the field of crime and punishment: (a) rational choice theory, (b) the broken-windows theory, (c) legitimacy theory, and (d) incapacitation theory. The first three operate through the intermediary of human consciousness. In each case, the theories depend on actors believing certain things and conforming their behavior accordingly. The first assumes that individuals pursue their self-interest or maximize their utility, and that, accordingly, when the cost of offending goes up, they will offend less. It is a theory that requires us to accept the idea that individuals-whether knowingly or unconsciously-conform their behavior to calculated expectations of success or failure. The second and third theories-brokenwindows and legitimacy theories-also depend on people taking cues from their social or physical environment-a disorderly neighborhood in one case, a discourteous or insolent police officer in another-and adapting their behavior accordingly. All three of these theories require a defined process of the human intellect and a decision about behavior.
They require the intermediation of human consciousness. They are neither true, nor false, just not-yet-falsified-properly, nor clearly falsifiable in the near future.
In contrast, the fourth theory involves social physics. If we physically detain an individual and isolate her from the free world, she will not commit statutory offenses on the outside. This is a matter of social physics, not modern social science. Similarly, transportation made it physically impossible for a convict to offend in the original jurisdiction. These types of theories alone are respectable hypotheses for the 21st century.
To be sure, it narrows the range of acceptable empirical and principled claims. But that's all for the better.
Randomization
Naturally, claims of social physics do not resolve the policy choices. The fact that incapacitation or transportation makes it physically impossible for the convict to offend (at least, in the original jurisdiction) does not tell us how much incapacitation we should have. It takes us to another empirical and theoretical gap that simply cannot be bridged.
Similarly, the triage and elimination of claims that rest of the intermediation of consciousness will leave us most often without any guidance, without any theory at all.
There will be no "best evidence" to fill the void. How then shall we organize our political and social environment?
The answer is randomization. Where our theories of social physics run out, where
we have swept away those other hypotheses that mediate through consciousness, we should leave the decision-making to chance. We should no longer take that leap of faith, but turn instead to the coin toss, the roll of the dice, the lottery draw-in sum, to randomization.
It turns out that this is far more difficult than it sounds at first. Practically every definitional term we use is loaded with different possible meanings, each of which reflects human choice. For instance, what does it mean exactly to distribute police resources "randomly"? Let's say we generate a random computer program, what is the unit of choice that we should select? Is it a certain population density or self-identified neighborhoods, or police precincts, or is it related somehow to crime rates? The selection of the unit of analysis will have significant distributional consequences. Population densities and crime rates may not map onto neighborhoods, for instance, and the selection of any one of these units as the basis for randomization will affect people differently.
How then do we even begin to select the unit of measurement for purposes of drawing straws? Could we deploy randomization here too? How would we implement this?
The answer has to be: Proceed with caution, be attentive to choice, and be prepared to correct the inevitable mistakes that will occur. Try to use as much brutal simplicity as possible to eliminate choice, but, where there is inevitable choice and indeterminacy, turn to chance. In many cases, it will be possible to eliminate the need for randomization simply by administering an intervention completely: instead of randomly choosing who to search at the airport, search everyone. This, I take it, is a form of brutal simplicity that achieves the same benefits as chance, but avoids the temporary dislocations of randomization. By combining completeness, simplicity, and choice, it might be possible to resolve many of the indeterminacies-better.
First, in the realm of surveillance, searches and detection, law enforcement agencies could turn either to completeness or to random sampling. The Internal Revenue
Service could audit tax returns at random using a social security number lottery system.
The Transportation Security Administration could search every passenger at the airport, or randomly select a certain percent based on a computer generated algorithm using last One possible consequence might be that we would limit the sentencing ranges.
Randomness reflects an honest recognition that we really do not know whether the sentence will deter or not, rehabilitate or not, or do justice. By leaving the sentence to chance (within the range), we are effectively acknowledging our own limitations.
Naturally, we would only want randomization between conceivable bounds, that is, within an acceptable range. But randomization would put pressure on the legislature to limit the range of possible theories that justify wider ranges of possible sentences. The wider the range of sentences, the clearer it is that we do not know what we are doing.
Randomization might also limit the range of possible forms of punishment. There is no guarantee, of course. It is possible that we may develop a taste for lotteries. But my sense is that, in the field of crime and punishment, it would limit, rather than promote, the proliferation of policing and punishment practices. In all likelihood, it would leave us with imprisonment as the primary mode of punishment.
By chastening our knowledge claims, randomization may also subject our punishment practices to greater economic scrutiny. Today we invest an extraordinary amount of resources into the criminal justice complex. The State of California alone, for instance, spends over five billion dollars in corrections, which is about as much-at times more-than it spends on education. [Detail national costs]. Studies suggest that these investments in prisons helped reduce crime in the 1990s and that about 25 percent of the crime drop in the country was attributable to the exponential increase in incarceration.
The day we fully acknowledge that we have no good idea whether this investment deters crime, rehabilitates convicts, or satisfies the urge for retribution, it may be far easier to assess the economic impact of the investment in more dispassionate and simple economic terms. enforcement officers, jockeys, railroad workers, and other classes of employees"
6.
Randomization is by no
Edmond. We have also become accustomed to metal detectors and x-ray machines that screen practically all people entering government buildings or embarking on planes.
Chance also plays a large role in the detection of crime: who gets apprehended and who does not most often turns on luck. As R.A. Duff writes, "One burglar is caught because the police are mounting a blitz on burglaries in that area at that time; another escapes detection because he happens to commit his burglary at some other place or time.
. . . In these and other ways the actual fate within the criminal system of two equally guilty offenders may be partly a matter of chance: one loses our in the criminal lottery, while the other wins" (1990:26-27 ). Yet few of us object to these "detection lotteries."
Few of us find that they seriously infringe on our sense of justice.
19
Efficiencies and Deterrence
Nevertheless, a call for more randomization will undoubtedly meet with great resistance. Many will instinctively protest that the use of chance is far less efficient than profiling or targeting higher offenders-that it is wasteful to expend law enforcement resources on low-risk offenders. There's no point conducting extra airport security checks on elderly grandmothers in wheelchairs and families with infants-or "Girl Scouts and grannies," as one recent commentator writes (Sperry 2005 ). As I demonstrate elsewhere with equations and graphs, 20 however, profiling on the basis of group offending rates may in fact be counterproductive and may actually cause more crime even under very conservative assumptions regarding the comparative elasticities of the different populations. We have no good theoretical reason to believe that targeted enforcement would be efficient in decreasing crime or would increase, rather than decrease, overall social welfare.
More sophisticated economists may respond that targeting enforcement on groups that are more responsive, at the margin, would maximize the return of any law 19 There are also historical instances of randomness in sentencing. One is the decimation of a military regiment as a form of punishment for mutiny. "Each soldier is punished for his part in the mutiny by a onein-ten risk of being put to death. It is a fairly pure penal lottery, but not entirely pure: the terror of waiting to see who must dies is part of the punishment, and this part falls with certainty on all the mutineers alike" (Lewis 1989:58) . 20 Harcourt 2007a, Against Prediction; Harcourt 2007b. enforcement investment. But here, we face an empirical void. What we would need is reliable empirical evidence concerning both the comparative offending rates and the comparative elasticities of the targeted and non-targeted populations. 21 That evidence, however, does not exist. The problem is not the reliability of the evidence, it's that it simply does not exist. 22 If there ever was a place to avoid taking leaps of faith, surely it would be here, where there is no empirical data whatsoever.
On the sentencing side, the conventional wisdom among law-and-economists is that increasing the probability of detection serves as a greater deterrent to crime than increasing the amount of the sanction because of the high discount rate imputed to criminals. Along these lines, it is generally argued that "it is plausible that young males who commit crimes discount the future disutility of imprisonment at a higher rate than the social discount rate, which also suggests that limited prison sentences and relatively high probabilities are optimal" (Polinsky and Shavell 1999:12). In this equation, the decision to embrace randomization in sentencing should have no effect on deterrence.
Using a sentencing lottery to determine the length of incarceration from within a sentencing guideline range, rather than using a grid that profiles on prior criminal history, gun use or other factors, would not change the certainty of the expected sentence and need not set the amount of the expected sentence.
The certainty of the expected sentence is going to be the same whether we employ a random lottery or a mechanism that profiles on a characteristic. Imagine, for instance, a sentencing range of 10 to 20 years for murder. Under a random lottery, a person convicted of murder can be certain that the expected sanction is 15 years. Under a sentencing scheme that profiles on prior criminal history, a person with a prior can be certain that the expected sanction will be, say, 18 years, and a person without a prior can be certain that the expected sanction will be, say, 12 years. The certainty is the same 21 I provide the formula at Harcourt 2007a:133. 22 There may be one single exception in the universe. Avner Bar-Ilan and Bruce Sacerdote have a working paper from 2001 that explores the comparative responsiveness to an increase in the fine for running a red light along several dimensions (finding that the elasticity of red light running with respect to the fine "is larger for younger drivers and drivers with older cars," equivalent for drivers "convicted of violent offenses or property offenses," and smallest, within Israel, for "members of ethnic minority groups"). A handful of other papers come close, but do not address the key issue of comparative elasticities. So, for instance, Paul Heaton's 2006 working paper on the effect of eliminating racial profiling policies in New Jersey on the offending of minorities, "Understanding the Effects of Anti-profiling Policies," does not address how the elasticity of black offenders compares to that of whites. . 24 Here, however, I am addressing the arguments against randomization and so will focus on the earlier theoretical argument against sentencing lotteries).
Harel and Segal offer the following hypothetical to support their case against sentencing lotteries. Imagine two possible sentencing schemes. Under the first, the convict is sentenced to five years in prison. Under the second, the convict is subject to a lottery with a 50% chance of receiving two years in prison and a 50% chance of receiving eight years in prison. Harel and Segal assume a certain discount rate, and then calculate 23 Some in fact argue that introducing randomization in sentencing may in fact increase deterrence because the criminal may not perceive risk of detection as a game of chance. David Lewis writes, "The criminal might think of escaping punishment as a game of skill-his skill, or perhaps his lawyer's. For all we know, a risk of losing a game of chance might be much more deterring than an equal risk of losing a game of skill" (Lewis 1989:60 Segal find, on these assumptions, that the potential convict "will prefer the sentencing lottery to the uniform sentencing scheme" (296). Harel and Segal write:
The reason that criminals prefer a sentencing lottery is that, if sent to prison, the convicted person has to surrender first the next few years, namely, those years that have the highest marginal utility. Thus, if a person is sentenced to five years in prison, she surrenders the next five years. If, on the other hand, she faces a lottery, she gains a larger benefit from the possible beneficial outcome, for instance two years in prison, than the loss resulting from the undesirable outcome, for instance eight years in prison. These considerations clearly suggest that in cases in which the sanctions involve imprisonment, individuals prefer sentencing lotteries over a uniform sentencing scheme. (1999:297) The trouble is, in this scenario, Harel and Segal have stacked the deck against the sentencing lottery by assuming that it has, on average, lower disutility. They are not comparing comparable sentencing scenarios. If instead we assume different discount rates that render the two alternatives comparable, or alternatively restructure the lottery so that its disutility is equivalent to that of a fixed five-year sentence, then there is no reason to believe that criminals would necessarily favor a sentencing lottery. It depends on their attitude to risk and how those preferences compare to the discount rate implicit in the lottery. Whoever designs the sentencing lottery can make it more or less attractive.
Harel and Segal note that psychological experiments have shown individuals to be averse to ambiguity-defined here as "uncertainty with respect to probabilities that certain states of affairs will materialize" (1999:291)-and for this reason argue that the best solution for enforcement is to misrepresent the likelihood of detection so that individuals overestimate the expected sentence. "An optimal legal system is therefore a system that disguises as much as possible the probability of sentencing. Ambiguity with respect to the probability of sentencing is a desirable feature of our enforcement mechanism" (1999:304). But the question of ambiguity is orthogonal to the choice between a sentencing lottery and targeted sentencing. Both a pure sentencing lottery and a sentencing scheme that targets persons with prior convictions (or other profiles) have the same level of certainty, even if the expected sentence is different. As noted earlier, in both scenarios, the certainty of the expected sentence will be the same: using the example above, in a pure lottery, the murder convict has an expected sentence of 15 years; in the targeted scheme, the murder convict with a prior record can expect 18 years, and the first timer 12 years. The certainty is the same, and it is up to the designer of the lottery to determine all expected sentences. Even assuming bounded rationality, a sentencing lottery would not necessarily have a negative impact on deterrence. 25 Moreover, as Harel and Segal recognize well, even fixed sentencing schemes have a significant element of chance. For instance, a lot will turn on the luck of the draw regarding which judge-lenient or sternpresides over the sentencing. The same is true for many other factors (Harel and Segal 1999:292) . 26 The complaint alleged one other incident: apparently, on another occasion, Friess asked courtroom spectators for a show of hands on whom to believe in a harassment case (Shipp 1983 ).
Another judge, Louis Rosenthal, also from the Brooklyn bench, confessed using a similar approach to speed up the arraignments of individuals charged with dealing three-card
Monte. Rosenthal testified that he'd give dealers the choice between pleading guilty or playing a hand themselves. He'd then write down three outcomes on separate pieces of paper: a $500 fine, 30 days in jail, or discharge. "I'm going to mix up these papers, and he's going to pick one," Rosenthal testified. "They would always plead guilty-they were afraid of the 30 days. . . They knew the odds were against them" (Herman and Johnston 1983) . (Rosenthal also resigned from the bench.)
The commission was not impressed and came down hard on Friess, finding that he had "exhibited extraordinarily poor judgment, utter contempt for the process of law and the grossest misunderstanding of the role and responsibility of a judge in our legal system. . . . He has severely prejudiced the administration of justice and demonstrated his unfitness to hold judicial office." Friess was barred from ever serving again as a judge in New York (Shipp 1983a ).
"A court of law is not a game of chance," the commission declared. "The public has every right to expect that a jurist will carefully weigh the matters at issue and, in good faith, render reasoned rulings and decisions. Abdicating such solemn responsibilities, particularly in so whimsical a manner as respondent exhibited, is inexcusable and indefensible" (Shipp 1983a ).
The few legal commentators who have opined on these matters tend to agree-or at least suggest that we, as a community, would tend to agree. "We insist upon deliberate, self-conscious decisionmaking," Judith Resnik suggests. "The coin flip offended this society's commitment to rationality. Whether or not a judge's mental processes, when pronouncing a sentence of twenty or thirty days, actually amount to anything more than a mental coin flip, the community wishes judicial rulings to appear to be the product of contemplative, deliberate, cognitive processes" (Resnik 1984:610-11 ).
This reflects-accurately, I believe-our general unease with chance in criminal sentencing. Wherever chance plays a role, there is controversy. The rules surrounding attempt liability, for instance, have spawned a large and controversial literature. The difference between an attempt and the completed offense is usually the product, factually, of pure luck-whether a bullet misses its target, whether a bomb fails to detonate. These are cases where, in the words of David Lewis, the punishment "leaves something to chance" and we have come to view them as "a disguised form of penal lottery" (Lewis 1989:58 Sanford Kadish calls attempt liability a "rationally indefensible doctrine" that "does not serve the crime preventive purposes of the criminal law" (1994:680). David Lewis concludes that "there is no adequate justification for punishing attempts more severely when they succeed" (1989:58). Another commentator declares that "we must adopt a solution that takes a clear stance on luck-that it does not matter" (Kessler 1994 (Kessler :2237 .
And yet, as a legal matter, the role of luck has been universally embraced in this country and in the West. Most jurisdictions in the United States impose a lesser sentence or half the punishment for attempts; beyond our borders, reduced punishment for attempts has achieved "near universal acceptance in Western law" (Kadish 1994:679) .
Why, then, this almost universal intuition against luck in criminal sentencing?
The reason, I would suggest, is because we believe that there is a rational alternative. We continue to believe that there is a better way, a more rational way, a more morally acceptable way. In discussing penal lotteries, R.A. Duff observes that lotteries are generally justified, from the perspective of fairness or justice, only when "there is no 27 The impossibility defense is now no longer the majority rule. other practicable or morally acceptable way of distributing the benefit or burden in question" (Duff 1990:26) . Lotteries are justified as a default mechanism when there is no other morally justifiable way: "What justifies such lotteries. . . is the fact that it is either impossible to eliminate them, or possible to reduce or eliminate them only at an unacceptably high cost" (Duff 1990:27 ).
Duff has it right. What justifies lotteries, morally, is the lack of an alternative.
Where he has it wrong, though-and where everyone seems to have it wrong-is in believing that there is a rational alternative. The fact is, we have hunches. We take leaps of faith. But we do not have good evidence or determined principles that resolve the sentencing ambiguities. Sentencing lotteries make sense, in the end, precisely because we have no better choice.
7.
Looking forward, it may be possible to tease together randomization, social physics, brutal simplicity, and, wherever possible, completeness, into a larger framework for the criminal justice system. The common gesture underlying these different impulses-especially the turn to randomization-is to question and ultimate reject social engineering through the crime sanction. Stopping to take leaps of faith means nothing more, in practice, than stopping to engineer persons and social relations through punishment practices. Here, then, would be a seven-point plan to brutally simplify our criminal justice sphere and stop, once and for all, trying to reshape, correct, deter or engineer the next generation:
1. Draft every young adult citizen for two years of civil service and assign twentyfive percent by lot to assist local police departments in providing security services. Another ten percent to provide security at prisons.
2.
Distribute law enforcement resources across sub-jurisdictions in proportion to population numbers and annually select and set enforcement priorities for undercover operations (as between, for example, public corruption, insider trading, drug trafficking, or violent crime) by lottery.
3.
Tax every citizen at a flat rate based on gross revenue and audit at random using a social security number lottery system.
4.
For corporations and government employers who adopt internal surveillance programs (audits, drug tests, etc.), administer the surveillance on a lottery basis and include all employees, executives, cabinet or board members-everyone.
5.
At all counter-terrorism check-points-from international airports to subway entrances and bus terminals-administer searches either on every passenger and traveler, or on the highest percent possible chosen at random.
6. Sentence convicts to a fixed term of incarceration by drawing straws, the length of which are determined by a legislatively fixed sentencing range.
7.
Classify prisoners to different prisons within their prescribed level of prison security (prescribed proportional to the perceived gravity of the offense) by lottery.
To be sure, we would still need to decide how much money to spend on prison building. We would still need to decide how much of the budget to allocate to law enforcement. But the decision would no longer turn on fictitious empirical claims.
Instead, it would be what it has always been: taste. Taste that would reflect either the result of a democratic vote or a totalitarian decree. We would have to decide how many prisoners we were comfortable incarcerating. And it would be no different for other choices: how much order or disorder we like, how much family and community dislocation we can tolerate. These decisions would revert to their rightful realm:
aesthetics, taste, and feelings for others-whether compassion or misanthropy. What we would have eliminated, though, is the fictitious and misleading social engineering.
As for reading and debating the work of contemporary moderns, in the twentyfirst century we must focus on interruptions in the answers people offer, not on the questions they pose or even simply the answers they give. We must explore what their leaps of faith tell us about their desires, their forms of rationality, and their intuitions of just punishment. The task is to unmask and expose their choices about punishment. None of the three modern questions were geared toward unmasking this choice-even the second, most critical question. They all effectively hid choice. The key now is to refocus the inquiry not on answering the questions, but on exploring the answers that are given.
For it is the answers that tell us the most. The task of reading the moderns, then, is to decipher what their answers tell us about their desires and reasoning on matters of just punishment.
8.
Moderns came in different flavors. There were those who didn't really notice they were taking a leap of faith. They worked through problems with reason-deriving principles, making empirical findings, drawing policy conclusions-without ever noticing that they were bridging some gap or ambiguity. There were those who spent all their time excavating the gaps and ambiguities, and then offering explanations for the leaps of faith-explanations which themselves always ended up bridging another gap. There were those who heard the voice of critical reason, but who adamantly denied that they were making any choices. And then there were those who believed they were, indeed, making a leap of faith, but felt there was no other option in the human domain and tried as best they could to render transparent their ethical choices.
We can think of these as stages of modernity: from early enlightenment, to critical theory, to positivist social science, to cultural critics, to postmodern ethicists. I myself have passed through many of them. Until recently, I truly believed that we should just accept the inevitable leaps of faith in human knowledge, but make them transparent. That we had to "dirty our hands" by setting out fully the ethical choices we make whenever we draw conclusions and advocate for public policies. My work, like that of many other poststructuralists-Foucault especially at the end of his life-had taken a turn to ethics and to the cultivation of the self. It seemed that there was no other option but to recognize human frailty and proceed more honestly.
No more. No more leaps of faith. There is an alternative. Whenever we are at the precipice of reason, faced with competing empirical hypotheses that have not been falsified or an indeterminate principle, or questionable assumptions, we need to stop using reason: stop rationalizing which hypothesis makes more sense, stop marshalling better reasons for one derivation of principle over another, stop legitimizing the questioned assumption. Turn instead to chance. Resolve the indeterminacy by drawing straws, flipping a coin, pulling numbers from a hat, running a randomized computer algorithm. We need to let chance take over when reason ends.
The end of modernity is within our reach. The final triumph of rationality is near.
Reason has finally achieved that exalted state of self-consciousness that can allow it to identify its own extremity and stop there: no longer to rely on blind faith in itself to bridge the inevitable gaps, ambiguities, and indeterminacies of human knowledge; no longer to fill that space beyond the non-falsified hypothesis; ready to relinquish that realm to chance, the coin toss, randomization-the arbitrary.
It is also, in some sense, the end of punishment as a transformative practice-as a practice intended to change mortals, to correct delinquents, to treat the deviant, to deter the super-predator. We have sanitized punishment: no longer the field of social engineering-but also no longer about moral education, nor about social intervention.
Punishment is unplugged and defused.
* * * Iris Marion Young urged me this past summer, in her subtle yet penetrating way, to use this opportunity to explore what a world without punishment would look like. I think I have seen it now. It is not a world without anything that could be described as punishment. The person convicted of murder or identity theft may still be sentenced and incarcerated. But it is a world in which we have ceased to punish in furtherance of hunches and unfounded theories-in which punishment is chastened by randomization.
